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There is an intense relationship between knowledge of the second and third kind in  
Spinoza’s classification of knowledge. Both of them are adequate, but only the second is the 
origin of the adequacy. Knowledge of the second kind consists of common notions, but 
common notions only constitute the essence of human body and what simpler than it. On the 
other hand, knowledge of the third kind is knowledge of essence of things. Therefore, the 
relationship between them and how knowledge of the second kind moves to the third become 
a problem. In this dissertation, I shall firstly evaluate two opposite interpretation and their 
flaws. And I will re-examine the definition of knowledge of the last two kinds, especially 
what are common notions and essence of things: the different degrees of common notions, 
and their difference with universal notions, what are singular things, how these things are 
defined, and finally what does essence mean. After these reevaluation, I will give my 
interpretation about how Spinoza, by changing the way definitions are formed, bridge the gap 
between knowledge of the last two kinds 
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Note on the Text 
All the texts cited, referred and mentioned in this dissertation are from  Curley’s The 
collected works of Spinoza. When I cite texts from Spinoza’s works except Ethics, the 
volume and page numbers cited refer to Carl Gebhardt edition (Heidelberg: Carl Winter 
Verlag, 1925, 4 vols), which is the standard edition of Spinoza’s works. Short Treatise and 
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect are abbreviated as ST and TdIE. 
Roman numerals refer to parts of Ethics, and Arabic numerals refer to different 








Def Aff=the definitions of the affects at the end of Part III  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Introduction 
The theory of knowledge is of great importance to Spinoza’s philosophy. Both his 
epistemology and ethics depend on how he define adequate and inadequate knowledge. 
Consisting of sense-perception, images, and signs, knowledge of the first kind, also called as 
opinion or imagination, is the origin of the inadequacy, through which human know nothing 
certain about the Nature or God (EIIP40S2). If human do not have adequate knowledge, they 
will never get the happiness and blessedness (EIIP49S). Thus, as two different kinds of 
adequate knowledge, knowledge of the second and third kind play a significant role in 
Spinoza’s philosophy. Through the former, for the first time, human find a certain method to 
acquire adequate ideas; and by these adequate ideas, they even can form the knowledge of 
God (EIIP47), proceeding from which the essence of things is achievable (knowledge of the 
third kind). Adequate knowledge is the only remedy for human to overcome passions 
(EVP4S); and the more knowledge of singular things human have, the more power of mind 
over affects. Thus, knowledge of the third kind, i.e. intuitive knowledge, is the key to 
happiness. However, how can human make the leap from inadequate knowledge to the 
adequacy? 
The classification of knowledge is also presented in Spinoza’s earlier works, both in 
ST and TdIE. In TdIE, where Spinoza calls knowledge “the perception”, the knowledge of the 
second kind is inadequate; and in ST, he calls it “a true belief”. Before Ethics, Spinoza does 
not assert that the knowledge of the second kind is the origin of adequacy. It is either a 
inadequate perception, or a true belief which knows things only through a conviction in the 
intellect (ST, I/55). Then, how Spinoza changes his mind and argues that knowledge of the 
second kind is adequate? A comparison of texts between descriptions of knowledge of the 
second kind will reveal the key to understand the uniqueness of it in Ethics. In TdIE and ST, 
Spinoza describes it as: 
The Perception that we have when the essence of a thing is inferred from another 
thing, but not adequately. This happens, either when we infer the cause from some 
effect, or when something is inferred from some universal, which some property 
always accompanies (TdIE, 19). 
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We call the second belief, because the things we grasp only through reason, we do not 
see, but know only through a conviction in the intellect that it must be so and not 
otherwise (ST, I/55). 
In Ethics, it is “from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the 
properties of things”. Compared with his earlier works, common notion, as a new concept, 
appears in Ethics which makes the knowledge of the second kind the origin of adequacy 
(properties are mentioned in TdIE) and starting point to the knowledge of the third kind. 
Through common notions, knowledge of the second kind is not restricted only to rational 
belief (ST, I/55), but it finally is adequate. It seems that intuitive knowledge arises from 
knowledge of the second kind, because of common notions. Nevertheless, there is a gap 
between these two kinds of knowledge: why through things common to all, essence of 
singular things can be known? The relationship between common notions and the essence of 
things is unknown and how knowledge of the second kind moves to the third is still a 
problem. Thus, I shall firstly give a brief discussion about how this topic is treated by 
scholars, why interpretations by now are still unsatisfactory, and why both of interpretations 
still not bridge the gap between the last two kinds of knowledge; because of the unclearness 
of the existed interpretations, I shall next re-examine the definition of last two kinds of 
knowledge to achieve a better understanding of them. Common notions and essence of things 
are key phrases of them. For the former, I will try to explicate what are common notions: 
their different degrees in terms of how general they are, the specialty of them as the sole 
origin of adequacy, the limits of common notions, and the difference between common 
notions and universal notions. As for the latter, I shall try to explain: what is singular things 
by explicating how Spinoza defines a singular thing, the inevitable consequences followed 
from his unique way of definition, and what is essence of things. After these re-examinations, 
I will explain how Spinoza destroys the limits of common notions, how knowledge of the 
second kind moves to the third, and how he uses his way of definition to find a chance for 
human to achieve adequate knowledge of things more complicated than them. 
An essential same or a complete different knowledge 
There are two question in this stage, the relationship between knowledge of the last 
two kinds, and how men proceed from the second to the third. Especially how common 
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notions could function as a bridge to the essence of things, given that singular things are the 
first step in knowing things (Melamed, 2013, p.47), and simple ideas are the first principle of 
Spinoza’s deductive system (Parkinson, 1953, p.37). Spinoza’s system will not be sound until 
these two question are solved.  
Spinoza’s classification of knowledge is rather vague. Nadler thinks the definition of 
the knowledge of the last two kinds are “frustratingly spare” and Spinoza “does little to spell 
out in detail what exactly each of these two kinds of knowledge involves”; thus, the 
relationship between them is not very clear (Nadler, 2006, p.178). Represented by Nadler and 
Parkinson, this interpretation argues that knowledge of the second and third kind are basically 
same and have few differences, though they are different in terms of using rules (Parkinson, 
p.190). Nadler contends that they are only different on their forms but not the content or 
information they contained. Knowledge of the second kind is logical inference; intuitive 
knowledge is more like an instant perception of the causality regarding singular things 
(Nadler, p.181). Both kinds of knowledge involve the knowledge of singular things. The 
former offers a explanatory framework, or properties of things in general of singular things; 
the latter shows how particular things “instantiate such properties” (Nadler, p.178). The fact 
that there is no qualitative difference between them means that only through knowledge of 
the second kind the intuitive knowledge can be grasped, for one cannot know anything about 
particular things without recognising what specific particular things they are.  
Another interpretation argues that these two kinds of knowledge are qualitative 
different. Nadler gives what he thinks a doubtful interpretation that there is gap between these 
two knowledge, the latter can be achieved only by a kind of “leap” (p.183). Jaspers also 
notices a “shift” from one class of knowledge to another, and knowledge of the second kind 
is endless and empty without the third (1962, p.28). As a result, whether knowledge of the 
third kind really arises from the second, and how this process works becomes dubious 
(Wilson, 1996, p.133). 
For the first interpretation, there are evidence in Spinoza’s texts: “the desire to know 
things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but can 
from the second” (VP28). However, Spinoza never explains how it works. Scholars simply 
make the similar claim but not fully explain the process between them. It is also not self-
sufficient to say both of them are inferential or deductive knowledge, so the third can arise 
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from the second. The premise of this argument is the equation of the second kind of 
knowledge with the third, but this premise is unexamined.  
Spinoza defines the knowledge of the second kind as the knowledge consists of 
common notions, and adequate ideas of the properties of things, which also arise from 
common notions (EIIP40S2). Thus, the basic components of it are common notions. 
Common notions as he described in IIP37, IIP38 and IIP39, are ideas of things common to 
all, or things common to and peculiar to human bodies and certain external bodies. Through 
ideas of things common to all to ideas common to human body and certain external thing, 
there are different degrees of common notions: through the most general common notion to 
the least general (Deleuze, 1988, p.115; Parkinson, p.165). Nevertheless, the first discrepancy 
between these two kinds of knowledge appears in IIP37, “What is common to all things and 
is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing”. 
Although there are all different degrees of common notions, at least the most general 
common notions do not “constitute the essence of any singular things”. If the intuitive 
knowledge is knowledge of essence of things, knowledge of the second kind, or at least part 
of it is qualitative different. 
The other interpretation is not without flaws. Intuitive knowledge is adequate, but the 
adequacy of knowledge arise and only arise from common notions (IIP38, IIP39). If there is 
unsolvable gap between them, or human can only achieve the third kind of knowledge by a 
“leap”, it will be dubious that anyone could ever have the intuitive knowledge. To understand 
the relation between common notions and essence of things, an in-depth examination of 
definitions of them is necessary.  
 Knowledge of the second kind re-examined: common notions and universal 
notions 
By definition, knowledge of the second kind is “from the fact that we have common 
notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things” (IIP40S2). Then, what are common 
notions, and adequate ideas of the properties of things need to be explicated separately. 
There are things common to all, and common notions are ideas of things common to 
all, or common to, and peculiar to human body and certain external bodies. The notion of 
extension is an example of the former kind, because all bodies have extension which means 
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extension is common to all; an example of the latter kind is hard to give, because Spinoza 
himself never gives one . The same speed of a bike and a car could be an example, but it may 1
need to be checked cautiously. The system of common notions is constructed by IIP38 and 
IIP39. From the most general common notions to the least general common notions, there are 
different degrees of them (Deleuze, p,115). It is hard to say how many degrees of them are 
there, but there is one thing certain that no matter to which degree these common notions 
belong, they can only be conceived adequately (IIP38, IIP38C, IIP39). Spinoza, in IIP29C, 
illustrates that human can only have inadequate or mutilated knowledge of itself, its body and 
external bodies, if they perceive things from the common order of nature. Then, why 
common notions are so special that only them can be conceived adequately? Why common 
notions are uncommon to the common order of nature? A brief discussion of knowledge of 
the first kind, or common order of nature, will help to achieve a better understanding.  
Images of things are “the affection of the human body whose ideas present external 
bodies as present to us” (IIP17S). Human bodies do not perceive directly external bodies, 
because they rather perceive images of bodies, i.e. ideas of affections; thus, human bodies can 
only directly know traces left by external bodies on human bodies; they do not really reach 
out to the external bodies but only a series of reactions made by human bodies. In a way, 
when human bodies perceive ideas of affection made by external bodies, they do not perceive 
external bodies but human bodies themselves. This process only involves the nature of 
external bodies, but never explicates the nature of it (IIP18S). And by IIP25D, “insofar as the 
external body is an individual which is not related to the human body, the idea, sive 
knowledge, of it is in God insofar as God is considered to be affected with the idea of another 
thing which is prior in nature to the external body itself”, so “the ideas of an affection of the 
human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body”. The knowledge of 
external bodies depends on the knowledge of things which cause them (IA4), namely those 
prior to the external things in nature; human bodies are affected by external bodies, and they 
are not the cause, or prior to the external bodies. Thus, human can never achieve the adequate 
knowledge of external bodies. Spinoza concludes in IIP29S, “so long as it (human mind) is 
determined externally, from fortuitous encounters with thing, to regard this or that, and not so 
 After the thorough examination of how Spinoza makes definition of singular things, it is easy to 1
understand why it is difficult to give an example of the less general common notions.
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long as it is determined internally, from the fact that it regards a number of things at once, to 
understand their agreements, differences and oppositions”, it has no adequate but a confused 
or mutilated knowledge of external bodies. However, if human mind is determined internally, 
then the adequate knowledge is achievable. Common notions are the way which mind can be 
determined internally. Therefore, “internally” will be the key to understand why common 
notions are so special through which human can have adequate knowledge. 
Taking the least general common notions as an example, suppose that there is one 
thing called A  common to, and peculiar to, human bodies and certain external bodies and it 2
is equal in the part and in the whole, which means A is not only an external thing but also an 
internal thing. It is external, since it belongs to the external body; it is internal, because it also 
belongs to the human body. A is inside of human body, so human body could be the cause of 
it, and human body is prior to A in nature. Although human still perceive its own body rather 
than external things, A contained in human body is common as A contained in the external 
things, which means that human can know A through knowing their bodies and the cause of A 
is human bodies. Then, A must be conceive adequately, because human mind is determined 
internally. As a consequence, human have adequate knowledge of A. And human can have 
adequate knowledge of the external thing which has A, though only part of external things is 
known, i.e. A. 
Now that common notions proved to be the source of adequate knowledge, the next 
question is does the common notion explicates the essence of things? Or are common notions 
the source of essence of things? Consisting of common notions, does the knowledge of the 
second kind contain the essence of things? The problem is complicated, considering there are 
different degrees of common notions. 
For the most general common notions, because things common to all do not constitute 
the essence of singular things. Even if human have adequate knowledge of them, they will 
not have adequate knowledge of essence of things. If, say A which is common to all, 
constitutes the essence of a singular thing, then according to IID2, there will be necessarily 
 It is difficult to give an example here. Spinoza himself also uses abstract “A” as an example when he 2
argues his theory of common notions. It seems a little odd, because Spinoza always gives a concrete 
example to prove his argument. For instance, he uses Paul and Peter in IIP17CS and other places. 
However, he omits this example in supporting his theory of common notions, because he completely 
changes the meaning of singular things. It may be the reason why he uses mathematics as an example to 
prove his classification of knowledge. 
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this singular thing constituted by A. However, if the singular thing exists and A constitutes its 
essence, then A cannot be the thing common to all, because it is the essence of singular 
things. Besides, the fact that A is something common to all means that all the things share A; 
and it is impossible that all things share one singular thing. Therefore, adequate knowledge of 
the most general common notions does not contain the essence of things.  
On the other hand, is the least general common notion able to constitute the essence 
of things, because they are not common to all, but only to two singular things? By the fact 
that human can have adequate knowledge of them, human may have adequate knowledge of 
human body and certain external bodies and so forth. And therefore, human can know the 
essence of things and intuitive knowledge does arise from knowledge of the second kind.  
However, this is not the cace. There are two things human can know adequately by 
the least general common notions. Firstly, human can know the property of external things, 
because this property is common to human and these things. Assuming that by the least 
general common notions, human can know the essence of something about human (property), 
but do not constitute the essence of human bodies. Because they are what common to human 
and external things, they should be neither completely human, nor external things. Properties 
belong to certain things but do not constitute their essence. Spinoza makes a contrast between 
property and essence in different texts (TdIE, II/35; Def Aff VI), indicating that only if the 
essence of things is known at first, properties of things can be understood; and human can 
know “neither what the being to which those propria belong is, nor what attribute is”(ST, I/
45) through properties . Properties do not constitute the essence of things. Thus, through 3
properties or the least general common notions, the essence of things is unachievable.  
Besides, if they constitute the essence of human body and external things, human 
must be equal to the external things, because they have a common essence. And if this is the 
case, then it is not a common notion, for human bodies are the same as external things, and 
there is only one thing.  
Human can also know its essence as a property of certain external things. Supposing 
B is something more complicated than human, and has essence of human as its property. 
Because what common to B and human is essence of human, then the essence of human is 
achievable. Since human bodies are only a property of B, then the essence of B and its 
 Proprium and proprietas are used interchangeably by Spinoza (Curely, p. 652)3
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remaining properties have nothing in common with human, and human cannot form any 
adequate knowledge of them. Therefore, through the least general common notions, not all 
essence of things are achievable.  
Some may argue that through common notions, certain essence is achievable. 
Although properties do not constitute the essence of things, but through the least general 
common notions, human at least know the essence of properties, and such properties may 
constitute the essence of other things. Common notions do not constitute the essence of 
things more complicated than human, but they constitute the essence of a part of human 
bodies, or human bodies themselves. Human can only know property of things. If they want 
to know the essence of things, either these things are parts of human, simper than human, or 
they have the same essence as human. Therefore, human as a medium can be used to know 
things simpler than human. However, the simplest thing can never be known, because it is not 
composed by anything and no thing is common to it. And, Spinoza explicitly says that human 
should seek knowledge from particular things, because “the more particular an idea is, the 
more distinct, and therefore the clearer it is” (TdIE, II/36).  
Analyses by far show the limits of knowledge of the second kind, or common notions. 
Human cannot know things more complicated than their bodies; and the simplest thing is also 
unachievable. 
The re-evaluation of knowledge of the second kind analyses both common notion and 
adequate ideas of properties of things, from which questions could be raised. Human can only 
have adequate knowledge of its parts and its bodies; it is also hardly possible that they could 
know things more complex than human body, like God. The question that what common 
notions are has been answered; next, what common notions are not will be discussed. This is 
important in fully understanding common notions. Scholars, who support the first 
interpretation, argue that knowledge of the second kind offers an explanatory framework of 
singular things, or properties of things in general, and intuitive knowledge shows how those 
general characteristics particularises in detail in singular things. They are different not in 
terms of contents but in forms. 
The premise of this interpretation is the existence of things in general, and general 
contents are common notions. However, this interpretation will not stand, until its premises 
are examined.  
 12
Firstly, whether these general contents are common notions? General contents of 
things, or ideas of general things, may be called general notions. “General notion” is vague, 
since Spinoza never uses this concept, but common notion and universal notion. Some 
scholars believe common notions are universal notions and both of them are general notions.  
According to Smith, “These common notions of reason merely express the general 
characteristics of each thing or class of thing rather than their individual essences.” He 
believes common notions are universal or general ideas. He argues that “the second kind of 
knowledge pertains to certain universal or general ideas ‘common to all men’” (p.89). With 
this equation between common notions and universal notions, undoubtably, things in general 
exist and human can have adequate knowledge of them, since the knowledge of common 
notions are adequate. It is true that Spinoza sometimes uses universal notions or universal 
knowledge (VP36S) to denote the adequate knowledge of things, but he only uses the 
expression “universal knowledge” once. As for universal notions, when he enumerates his 
classification of knowledge in IIP40S2, saying that “it is clear that we perceive many things 
and form universal notions”, he includes all three kinds of knowledge in universal notions, 
both adequate and inadequate one. However, these two separated texts cannot be the evidence 
that Spinoza uses “common notions” and “universal notions” interchangeably. Spinoza 
discussed these terms in his earlier works, which may help us achieve a better understanding: 
In TdIE and ST he says: 
For when things are conceived abstractly (as all universals are), they always have a 
wider extension in our intellect than their particulars can really have in nature. And 
then, since there are many things in nature whose difference is so slight that it almost 
escapes the intellect, it can easily happen, if they are conceived abstractly, that they 
are confused (TdIE, II/29). 
But we have rightly regarded this as indicating their ignorance; for all and only the 
particulars have a cause, not the universals, because they are nothing (ST, I/43). 
But as we have already said, things must agree with their particular Ideas, whose 
being must be a perfect essence, and not with universal ones, because then they would 
not exist (ST, I/49). 
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From these texts, we could know that all abstract ideas are confused, and universal 
ideas are abstract ideas; universal notions are “nothing”, or “do not exist”. They are beings of 
reason, which do not exist in real world, but only in human mind (ST, I/33). Being of reason 
also means being of imagination, which is invented, like numbers, to help human to reach a 
better understanding of external things (Parkinson, p.150). Besides, he makes a clear 
distinction between universal notions and common notions. In IIP40S1, he says that he will 
omit the thorough discussion about notions which are ill-founded, of hardly any use, but he 
will not omit the necessary discussion about them. Thus, Spinoza decides to discuss briefly 
about transcendentals terms and universal notions. Notions like being, thing and something 
are transcendental terms. These notions arise from the body which is affected by an excessive 
number of images simultaneously; and because the mind can only form a certain number of 
images at a time, if there are too many images beyond the capacity of the body 
simultaneously, the mind cannot discern even slight differences between these images. Thus, 
“the mind also will imagine all the bodies confusedly , without any distinction and 
comprehend then as if under one attribute, viz. under the attribute of being, thing, etc”, and 
“these terms signify ideas that are confused in the highest degree.” Universal notions, on the 
other hand, are caused by similar reasons: “Those notions they call Universal, like Man, 
Horse, Dog, etc., have arisen from similar causes”, which means these universal notions are 
confused too, because they arise from imagination, and abstract from excessive numbers of 
images. These notions are  inadequate, because “these notions are not formed by all in the 
same way”. Different people may have different standard for the framework of genus, such as 
“man, horse and dog”. As a result, these notions are not common to all men. Different bodies, 
which form such notions, may be affected in different degree even at the same time, or even 
the same body may be affected in different degree at different time. Such notions are 
inadequate, because they do not have “all the intrinsic denominations of a true idea”(IID4); 
and they are definitely not common notions. In conclusion, general contents are universal 
notions, but universal notions are not common notions. Universal notions represents the 
general contents of singular things, but these general contents are images formed by human 
bodies. These universal notions are confused notions, and general contents are not the origin 
of adequate knowledge.  
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The existence of general things or their essence is another question to be answered. 
Some may think knowledge of the second kind offers a framework for the recognition of 
things. If men want to recognise particular things by their general framework, they need to 
firstly know what are those general things, or have ideas of them. For instance, human need a 
general knowledge of hammers in general to recognise a particular hammer. But before that, 
they need to know what the hammer in general is, i.e. the idea of hammer in general. After 
they know it, a tool with a metal head and a wooden handle used to hammer nails and so 
forth, they will recognise a particular hammer. However, by IIP7, “The order and connection 
of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things”, if there is an idea of hammer in 
general, then the hammer in general must exist. If the hammer in general exists, then it will 
not be a thing in general, because things in general means that they are general but not 
singular or particular . As a result, if there is no thing in general, there will not be ideas of 4
them.  
The variant of this interpretation believes that through common notions one can know 
the essence of things in general (Smith, p.89). For example, one can know what is the essence 
of hammer, i.e. “hammerness”, but not the essence of a particular hammer. By this process, 
one will know the essence of things in general first, and then he will proceed from it to the 
essence of particular things. This interpretation is incorrect too. By IID2, “I say that to the 
essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited and 
which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing 
can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be conceived without the 
thing”, there is mutual relationship between essence of things and things to which the essence 
belongs. If there is the essence, then things to which the essence belongs must exist; and if 
there are things to which the essence belongs, then the essence must be. This mutual 
relationship makes sure the mutual existence between essence and things. Thus, there is 
neither essence of things in general, nor general things themselves, not mentioned ideas of 
things in general; by the definition of things in general, they cannot be real and they are only 
being of reason.  
 Spinoza uses singular and particular things interchangeably, see Glossary in The Collected Works of 4
Spinoza Volume I, edited by Curley, p.649.
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Now, common notions are the source of adequacy. They are special, because they are 
determined internally in human bodies. As a consequence, human are the cause of things to 
be known and human are able to form adequate knowledge. Common notions are not 
universal notions, so they are not ideas of genus, or things in general. Common notions have 
boundaries. The knowledge composed by common notions, knowledge of the second kind, is 
limited knowledge, including at most knowledge of human bodies. The limits of common 
notions will raise another problem: when Spinoza explicates common notions, what is the 
meaning of words like “human” or “things”, on the condition that all of them are confused or 
mutilated ideas? If these terms are inadequate, the whole Ethics will be at risk, since Spinoza 
uses them to build his philosophy. Essence of things may become confused, because of the 
application of mutilated terms; and intuitive knowledge may be inadequate. If only essence of 
human, or parts of human is achievable, and neither the simplest things nor things bigger than 
human is achievable, how human know the essence of “each thing”(IIIP6), or even of God 
(IIP47S)?  
Some may object that the knowledge of human is sufficient, for knowledge of things, 
such as knowledge of sun, math or even Nature is conceived through human bodies. If human 
know their bodies well, they will know everything in universe conceived through their 
bodies. However, this is definitely not what Spinoza would agree. In the quotation from ST 
above, knowledge of things should not only exist in human intellect, it should also be in the 
real world, it must be the knowledge of actual things, rather than images reflected in mind.  
The discussion about what common notions are shows their limits; through them 
human could acquire at most knowledge of themselves. What common notions are not, on the 
other hand, raises new question regarding how intuitive knowledge could be adequate. This 
means the problem regarding how knowledge of the third kind derived from the second is 
still unsolved. 
Intuitive knowledge re-examined: things, its definition and essence 
The re-examination does not solve the problem about how knowledge of the second 
kind moves to the third, it even raises a new one. Intuitive knowledge may no longer be 
adequate; How Spinoza defines “essence of things” becomes crucial. If intuitive knowledge 
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is inadequate, there will be no relation between knowledge of the last two kinds. Therefore, it 
is time to examine intuitive knowledge.  
Spinoza defines intuitive knowledge as follows:  
And this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of 
certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things (IIP40S2).
Intuitive knowledge focuses on the essence of things. If intuitive knowledge is 
adequate, “things” need to be adequate, not “confused in the highest degree”; and therefore, 
how “things” are defined must be examined. Examining how Spinoza defines singular things 
is key to understand why “essence of things” is adequate knowledge. In IP25C, Spinoza 
defines “that particular things are nothing but affections of God’s attributes, or modes by 
which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way”. It is basically the 
same as the definition of singular things in IID7. Singular things are finite modes of God and 
durational existence. However, Spinoza adds details to this definition about how one singular 
thing can be distinguished from things:  
And if a number of Individuals so concur in one action that together they are all the 
cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing (IID7). 
It is easy to understand. If A1 cause B, A2 also cause B, A3 and A4 to the infinity, 
then all of A can be seen as one singular thing, for all of them are the cause of B; apart from 
this, things with different nature can also be seen as one singular thing. Take the human body 
as an example: human body is compose by different organs, each of which has a particular 
function and cannot be seen as the same organ; however, if all these organs function to 
produce one and the same effect, i.e. all of them are cause of one effect, then they can be seen 
as one singular thing. In this case, human can be seen as one singular thing, though it is 
composed by things with different essence. Spinoza explicates details on how to distinguish 
one singular thing from others, or why a singular thing can be considered as one singular 
thing rather than two or more. He demonstrates four different standards to recognise one 
singular thing in his lemmas. Firstly, if a body or individual composed by a number of bodies, 
when some of them are taken away or removed and another bodies with the same nature or 
essence take the place of those removed, then the individual remain the same singular thing 
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as before (IIL4), considering a man replaced his arm; on the second, if the part of a composed 
individual is changed, no matter to which degrees it changed, as long as the ratio of motion 
and rest between the part changed and the parts remained of the same individual keeps the 
same, the individual can be seen as the same singular thing (IIL5). Considering a man with a 
metal leg, the nature of this leg is changed, but the ratio between this metal leg and whole 
human action is remain relatively the same; next, if the motion of  parts composing an 
individual is altered to another direction, as long as these parts continue its motions and 
“communicate them in the same ratio as before”, the nature of this individual will remain the 
same (IIL6); finally, no matter what happens to it as a whole, or among its parts, so long as 
all its parts communicates with each other and keep the same ratio as before, the composed 
individual will retain its essence (IIL7). From these lemmas, rules of recognising one singular 
thing can be epitomised that no matter what happened to the parts of one individual or an 
individual as a whole, as long as the ratio or communication of the motion between its parts 
remains the same, the individual retains its essence, and remains as one singular thing. The 
key of these lemmas is the ratio or communication of motion between parts. Spinoza roughly 
gives three kinds of individuals; nevertheless, this is not a rigid calcification, since composed 
individuals have infinite kinds, and the most complicated one is Nature itself which is 
composed by things with different essence. In Spinozistic philosophy, the world is composed 
by different individuals. Therefore, the only way of recognising an individual is through its 
ratio of motion. As long as the ratio is the same, the individual is the same; if the ration is 
changed, no matter to which direction, or how its proportion changed, the individual will 
change. This explains IID7; “a number of individuals concur in one action and are the same 
cause of one effect” means that if a number of individuals, which move to a same direction or 
rest simultaneously, the communication of its parts remain the same, they can be seen as one 
singular thing. From Spinoza’s analysis of bodies, it is clear how he defines one singular 
thing, by the ratio of motions of parts of a composed body.  
Some may argue that the standard of recognising one singular thing is derived from 
Spinoza’s physics and they are all about bodies, but the essence of things contained things 
more than bodies; these rules won’t apply to ideas. However, Spinoza thinks that the 
knowledge of bodies is sufficient for knowing ideas, because human bodies are the nature of 
human mind. As for thing, if one wants to know the essence of an idea, one needs to know 
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the nature of its object at first (II13S). Thus, the rules derived from Spinoza’s physics can be 
used as the rules on recognising things beyond the bodies, i.e. ideas. Apart from this, his 
parallelism makes sure that if parts of bodies keep the same ratio as before, the particular 
thing remains the same, and the idea must be the same (IIP7). 
It is obvious that Spinoza changes the way philosophers used to make a definition for 
singular things, and the consequence followed explains why intuitive knowledge could be 
adequate. The traditional definition is formed by genus and difference as Spinoza mentioned 
(ST, I/46), but Spinoza defines a singular thing by its particular motion. A definition must be 
true and adequate, and “the right way of discovery is to form thoughts from some given 
definition” (TdIE, II/34). Spinoza is unsatisfied with the traditional definition and he thinks a 
perfect definition “will have to explain the inmost essence of the thing, and to take care not to 
use certain propria in its place” (TdIE, II/35). He uses a geometrical example, saying that if a 
circle is defined as the figure “in which the lines drawn from the center to the circumference 
are equal” (TdIE, II/35). This definition only reveals the properties but not the essence of a 
circle, because it does not explain how circle moves; thus, by definition, the things to be 
defined cannot be know adequately. A good definition needs to include the proximate causes 
of the thing defined, and can deduce all the properties of this thing. As Curley said, the 
definition “describes a process by which a thing of that kind might be produced, as stating 
condition which would lead to the existence of a thing of that kind” (Curley, 1988, p.111). 
The definition of one thing is a process or motion, from which all the properties or effects 
follow. And a definition which contains the fixed motion of the thing defined is perfect 
definition, and reveals its inmost essence. Because its inmost essence is contained in the 
definition, the definition is adequate and true.  
Now, we have two adequate ideas by far, common notions and definitions. Common 
notions are ideas of things common to at least two different bodies; definitions, on the other 
hand, reveal the inmost essence of one particular thing. These two terms seems unrelated. 
However, if we compare the traditional definition with Spinozistic definition, there will be a 
connection. 
The traditional way of definition Spinoza opposed “must be by genus and 
difference”(ST, I/46), but “if we can only know a thing perfectly through a definition 
consisting of genus and difference, then we can never know perfectly the highest genus, 
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which has no genus above it. Now if the highest genus, which is the cause of the knowledge 
of all other things, is not known, the other things which are explained by that genus are much 
less known or understood” (ST, I/46). The traditional definition is by genus and difference, 
rather than the inmost essence of things . It will not produce adequate knowledge, for genus 
like man, dog, and hammer are universal notions. Genus is abstraction which is confused 
(Deleuze, p.46). If a definition is adequate, it won’t show a kind of things, or thing in general, 
but a particular one. For instance, the definition of human won’t include all human being as a 
kind, but a particular human, because there are no true human being as a kind, but only an 
imagination helping human to understand reality. The essence of human being, or human 
nature is a particular motion. What conform with this motion, or keep the same ration of 
motion between its parts as human, can be called human. Although by a slightly different 
reason (make sure IIIP4 be true), Curley also thinks definition are not definitions of genus, 
but a particular thing (p.112). The actual world is composed by all different individuals and 
there are not kinds of things in the world. Obviously, there will be objections that Spinoza’s 
doctrine of genus is against common sense; and if there is no kind of thing, when Spinoza 
makes his argument about human, does he not use the genus? If he uses human bodies as a 
genus, his philosophy is based on non-existed things; but if he uses human bodies as a 
particular thing or body, how it could be universal and persuade everyone? 
Indeed, this theory sounds against the common sense, for human perceive the world 
with genus and difference. If there is no genus, the world will be chaotic and without order. 
For Spinoza, an ordered world is a world for common people; and if human perceive things 
from common order of nature, they will never reach the adequate knowledge, but a confused 
and mutilated one (IIP29S). Back to the example of human, is there a kind of thing called 
human? And how Spinoza uses words like “human” or “human body”? Actually, Spinoza 
does not believe there is human nature or essence of human; and as a consequence, there is 
no kind of human. When Spinoza discusses the gladness between horse and human in 
IIIP57S, he argues that the gladness between them is different, because they have a different 
essence; and he continues that the gladness between a drunk and a philosopher is no small 
difference, which implies that the essence of a drunk and a philosopher is different. By the 
common order of nature, we accustomed to say that both a drunk and a philosopher are 
human, which means they have the same essence. The difference between them are their 
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properties; however, Spinoza denies that they have the same essence. If they do not have the 
same essence, they are not one singular thing; indeed both of them are human, but this time 
human are just the being of reason, not real. The drunk and the philosopher are essential 
different and there are not human being. Although Spinoza rejects the concept of human, he 
still uses it to build his philosophy, but he does not use it without reason. He discusses terms 
like “good”, “evil”, “perfect” and “imperfect” in the preface of part IV, saying that though 
these terms are not real, he will retain them in order to form an idea of man, as a model of 
human nature. Thus, Spinoza sets a model of man for his reader, and the word “man” in his 
book is not some random man but the model he set for human being.  
Now, we know there is no genus and world is composed by all different kinds of 
individuals. One individual can only be discerned from another individuals by its essence, its 
motion rather its properties. Their motion is the standard to recognise any individuals. Thus, 
these motions of individuals are their definition. And as a consequence, the real world, a 
world without imaginations, is a both more complicated and simpler world. It is more 
complicated, because there is no genus and the world is not ordered as it was; it is also 
simpler, for all kinds of things are included in one kind, individuals with different motions. 
For example, there are two men, Peter and Paul . If Peter has a different, or opposite motion 5
compared with Paul. They are two different individuals, or two different things; they cannot 
be included in the same kind, human. Any terms, like man, trying to include them in one 
category will be false, because their essence is different, even opposite. Another example, the 
difference between a philosopher and a drunk, is given by Spinoza.  6
Now that the meaning of “things” is clear, the only term which needs to be examined 
is “essence”. When Spinoza uses the word “essence”, what is it he really indicates? At the 
Part I, he mentions that the essence of God is his power (IP34). He continues in IIIP7 that 
“conatus by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual 
essence of the thing” (IIIP7). It seems that the essence of God and things is the power or 
striving. And in the demonstration of the same proposition, he uses “power” and “conatus” 
interchangeably. In IVD8 Spinoza uses “essence”, ”virtue”, and ”nature” interchangeably. 
 Peter and Paul are used by Spinoza serval times. 5
 It is this reason that examples are so hard to give in demonstrating the adequate knowledge, for there is 6
no genus. Spinoza uses math as an example, but it is rather misleading, because numbers are being of 
reason. They do not exist in the real world. (Wilson, p.132)
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Conatus is the actual essence of things; and conatus is a kind of motion . Thus, the nature or 7
essence of things is its power or motion. 
In the discussion above, we find that by common notions human cannot get the 
adequate knowledge about simplest bodies and can know at most knowledge of himself; 
anything beyond human bodies will not be known, because they have nothing in common 
with human bodies and no common notions for human to use. If we take Spinozistic 
definitions into consideration, another interpretation may appear. The gap is how the 
knowledge of the second kind moves to the third, on the condition that it is a knowledge at 
most about human bodies; intuitive knowledge, on the other hand, is essence of things, not 
only essence of man. The origin of adequacy is the common notion, and it has limits. 
However, only when genus and difference are used in forming traditional definitions, this 
problem occurs. No genus exists in the Spinozistic philosophy, so the relationship between 
human bodies and external things is changed and the boundaries of common notions vanish. 
The essence of any bodies is its motion, so what makes the human a human is its particular 
motion, say it is “human motion”. Anything moves with the same ratio, or moves according 
to this “human motion”, can be called human. As long as two thing moves in the same ratio, 
“human motion”, they will be called human. For example, Paul is a man who is ready to form 
adequate knowledge. The thing to be known is a individual of a higher kind, say society or 
anything more complicated than Paul. By the traditional definitions, Paul can know 
adequately no more than the part common to him in this particular thing. However, if Paul 
changes his motion, or conatus, to the same motion of society, he will know the essence of 
this society, because they have the same essence. Thus, adequate knowledge of this more 
complicated thing is possible. In this case, there is no rigid category called human bodies. 
Indeed, human can only know knowledge at most to things common to its own bodies, but 
there is no rigid boundaries of human bodies. With the increasing of its power, the changing 
of its motion and the alternation of its essence, the capacity to be affected by external things, 
to know external things is changed. With this alternation, there are more things common to 
human bodies, and the more things human bodies common to, the more adequate knowledge 
 Another philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who made a huge influence on Spinoza, used the concept conatus 7
or endeavour as a motion.
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acquired by human, though the human body in question is no longer the genus of all men, but 
a particular one.  
With the analyses of key concept of intuitive knowledge, essence of things or their 
motions show its relation with common notions. Together with common notions, there is 
finally a way to solve the gap between knowledge of the last two kinds. The way definition 
are formed is changed, the definition of human is change. If what are human is changed, what 
common to human is changed. By altering its motion, human can be common to all different 
kinds of things, and ideas of human could be used as common notions to acquire adequate 
knowledge.  
Conclusion 
We can finally make comments on those two interpretations. Both of them are partly 
true and partly false: the first is true, because knowledge of the second kind does involve the 
essence of things, but this knowledge only contains very limited knowledge, such as 
properties of human bodies, and never extends beyond the human bodies; it is wrong, 
because there is no general contents of things, not mentioned that there is knowledge of 
general content of things. All the general contents, which represented by universal notions, 
are confused. The second interpretation is correct, because of its insight about the distinction 
between knowledge of the second kind and third kind. However, it fails to grasp the real 
relationship between them. The real difference between these two knowledge is not that the 
one can know common notion, but the other can know the essence of things. The real 
difference is that the former can only have limited knowledge about human bodies, nothing 
more, but the latter, on the bases of power or motion, can know the essence far more than the 
former. Through the formal essence of certain attribute of God, through the power, human at 
least has a chance to know every things whose essence is power. 
With the intense relationship between common notions and essence things, it seems 
difficult to say that human have any chance to know the adequate knowledge beyond what is 
common to human; the knowledge of complicated things, and the knowledge of the 
individual composed in the highest degree is unachievable, because there are many things in 
them which do not common to human bodies; and the simplest bodies are also not available 
to human mind, because as simplest bodies, they have nothing in common with others things. 
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But after the re-examination of Spinoza’s usage of human, singular things, essence and 
definition, there is no absolute limits of human bodies. By the increases and decreases of its 
power, human bodies can common to more, or less complicated things; therefore, they can 
know more adequate knowledge, even of simplest bodies. The real difference between 
knowledge of the second and the third kind, or between common notions and essence of 
things is how “things” are defined. If there are only first two kinds of knowledge, then only 
essence of limited things are known. But through knowledge of the third kind, especially 
through the formal essence of certain attributes of God, in this case, through power, adequate 
knowledge of essence of everything could be possible. Through the essence of things, namely 
power, human can even reach to the essence of God, and have the knowledge of God. 
Spinoza breaks the traditional classification of things. There is no genus, and definitions 
should aim at the inmost essence of things, i.e. their motion or power. The world no longer to 
be a hierarchical world, and there is no “great chains of being”. The whole world is one, and 
this one is what he called Nature (IIL3C), the most complex individual composed by different 
kinds of individuals, each of which has no difference in genus but in their motion or power. 
As the bases of his ethics, these two kinds of knowledge proffers the answer about the 
essence of human. And by this answer, namely the essence of human is conatus or power, 
Spinoza could distinguish two different affections, action and passion, by which human know 
the bondage of them and how they pursue freedom. The relationship between common 
notions and essence of things is complicated and against common sense, but only with the 
understanding of them can the true significance of Spinoza’s theory of knowledge be 
revealed. It is not easy to understand, some even think there is no good solution to this riddle 
(Wilson, p.132-p.133). However, as Spinoza said, “but all the things excellence are as 
difficult as they are rare” (VP42S). 
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